The Implications of Free Will
May 27, 2005 Posted by Roger Overton
Go and read this interview with Bruce Ware on Free Will (HT: Justin Taylor BTW). If someone were looking for a succinct explanation of Calvinist theology and philosophy in contrast to Arminianism, they could likely do no better than what Ware has offered here. There’s a lot of juicy theology discussed; I’ll only touch on a bit of it.
Dr. Ware does a decent job of summing up the libertarian view of freedom, which is a foundation of Arminianism. This view says that are choices are completely arbitrary, independent of outside forces. Dr. J.P. Moreland, a libertarian, sums it up this way, “When an agent acts freely, he is a first or unmoved mover; no event causes him to act. His desires, beliefs, etc. may influence his choice, but free acts are not caused by prior states in the agent.” In other words, in order to really be free, nothing outside of ourselves may influence what we do. The fact that it’s hot outside must be irrelevant to my decision to have ice cream. For Dr. Moreland we are “unmoved movers,” meaning the only motivation for our decisions can be found within ourselves.
Compatiblism says that outside factors do influence our decisions. If it weren’t hot outside, I would not have walked into Cold Stone Creamery and ordered a Cheesecake ice cream with caramel, snickers, and white chocolate chips (pardon me while I dream for a second…). Why wouldn’t I? Because I would have had no desire to do so. My desire for ice cream is directly caused by an outside factor, in this case the heat of living in Southern California.
Our ideas of freedom, in America especially, have changed. When the founding fathers wrote up our early documents they spoke of freedom, but not the freedom we speak of today. They sought freedom to be able to do what they ought to do. Today our culture relishes freedom to do what we want to do. To some degree, this is the difference between Compatiblism and Libertarianism. Compatiblists recognize that we have no natural desire to do what we ought to do. Libertarians believe that we can do what we ought to do; we will find the motivation within ourselves to do what we ought and what we ought not. Therefore, the only freedom needed is the freedom to do what one wants. Interestingly, this American dichotomy between the freedom for what we ought and the freedom for what we want was brought to my attention by Dr. Moreland.
Awhile back I heard Michael Horton make a comment about how Arminianism is responsible for many of the problems in our culture today. At the time I thought that was a gross over generalization. But in light of this discussion, I can see how that may be the case. Once we assume that we have the ability within ourselves to do what we ought, the moral framework of our society will deteriorate (as it has been doing). Society will believe that humans are either basically good or basically neutral. We will lose the idea that there is an objective ought (outside standard for morality) and our own desires will become the standard for what we ought to do. And so today in America we ought to do as we please; be it kill an unborn human, marry someone of the same-sex, ignore genocide in a foreign country, etc. Because of this libertarian notion of freedom we have become a society enslaved to our own sinful desires. God save America.
Related posts:
- ETS 2008 – James Spiegel “Free Will and Soul Making”
- Implications
- Playing Politics With Same-Sex Marriage And Undermining A Free Society
- A Two-Way Street: Free Will, Suffering & The Glory Of God
- Free Audio: Systematic Theology by Michael Horton
- Free Jonathan Edwards
Posted in Main Page, Philosophy, Roger's Posts, Theology
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May 27th, 2005 at 6:17 pm
Roger, Roger, Roger…what a caricature you (and Ware) have offered of libertarian agency. If J.P. sees you haphazardly erecting straw men like this, he may change his mind about letting you into the M.A. Philosophy program at Talbot!
See J.P.'s discussion of libertarian agency in the book, Body and Soul, chapter 4. Notice the careful distinctions libertarians make between pure voluntary acts and intentional voluntary acts done for a reason. Also, note the distinction between effecient and final causes. Ware either ignores these key distinctions or he is uninformed.
And the wildly implausible causal connection you draw between libertarian freedom and same-sex marriage, abortion, etc. simply falls apart along with your straw man.
Don't let this happen again or I'm telling J.P. on you!
May 27th, 2005 at 6:27 pm
The generalization/motivation sword cuts both ways (societies in history and their morality seems more cyclical than downward spiral, but that's just an aside). Oddly, having read the piece, I find its description of choice nearly identical to Thomas Hobbes' mechanistic account of human decision-making in the beginning of the Leviathan. The last desire wins out, and we have no or very limited access to the underlying and unseen factors that make us choose what we do. Ware has God knowing these things; Hobbes doesn't address God (at least relating to human decision-making).
).
This doesn't mean Ware is wrong, that would be guilt by association (the similarities with Marx's historical theory notwithstanding). I don't want to go down this rabbit hole again, but I do want to make three brief points (ultimately I think I'm leaning toward the view that one's view of free will is an a priori first principle, incapable of proof or disproof because the conclusion is always assumed in the premise).
1) Free-willers (for lack of a better term atm) do not think free choice means radically free choice absent underlying factors. This is a false characterization. No one, not even God, is free to make decisions against one's nature. His ice cream example compared the moment before making the choice (peppermint looks good, but chocolate does to), with the moment afterwards after the choice has been made.
2) I affirm that there are arbitary choices. This does not entail that every choice is arbitrary. Chocolate or vanilla, steak or chicken, these are morally arbitrary and it doesn't really matter morally what we choose. But there are morally non-arbitrary choices too: adultery or not, white lie or embarrassing truth, smoking or not. I think there are reasons, some good, and some not, and we can use our God-given reason to align our (imperfect and rebellious) will with the right reason. I don't know why it follows, biblically or philosphically, why some arbitrary choices means all choices are arbitrary. I think Ware confounds “reasons” with “causes”. In his understanding, there is no such thing as a “reason” classically understood (a synopsis can be found here and here .)
3. Finally, I don't see how Ware's thinking doesn't lead to the hyper-determinism expressed by others in a similar vein (i.e the last comment-rabbit-hole-Hades I contributed to here
None of these points prove my point, nor will be persuasive I know. I don't see how this viewpoint is compatible with “morality” at all. If our illusion of making choices is truly illusory, then we are basically watching a movie of our lives, waiting (perhaps?) to wake up in heaven truly free (though it seems if free will here is nonsensical and/or an insult to God's sovereignty I don't know why it would be okay in the hereafter).
(one last btw, totally agree that the Founders thought freedom the ability to do what one ought. But this is a different kettle of fish from the free-will issues addressed by Ware, I suspect the FF would fall on both sides of the question)
May 27th, 2005 at 7:48 pm
Brett, after re-reading my own post I think you're right. Melinda mentioned this as well. I didn't mean to say that the libertairan view completely denies the influence of outside factors in choices. Rather, outside factors do not necessarily impacts choice. The libertarian view says that our choices may be arbitrary, whether they are our not depends on the agent, the potentially “unmoved mover.” Perhaps Moreland says differently in Body and Soul, I haven't read it, but I don't know how else to read this article I've quoted from. Additionally, this is how I viewed it when I was a libertarian.
You haven't shown how my conclusions at the end fall apart or constitute a straw man. Further, I only offered it as what may be the case, something I think is worth considering.
Micah, the use of “arbitrary” wasn't moral. It was in relation to that factors that influence our choices. I agree that some choices are morally arbitrary as you put it- however, I don't believe any of our choices are causally arbitrary.
As I said, I affirm free will. I don't think our choices are illusory. We actually make choices. The question is why we make the choices we do.
As for Ware, I'm not sure if he's ignorant or ignoring distinctions. My guess is his writing is more precise in dealing with the nuances. He may believe that even though a libertarian would make these distinctions they inevitably end up with how he characterized it. I have no idea.
May 28th, 2005 at 12:58 am
As a matter of procedure, when two people whom I respect as being more knowledgeable in an area tell me I'm wrong I consider that grounds enough to say I probably am. In this case, I really haven't studied the philosophical issues that much, and Brett and Melinda have. So everyone is free to ignore my ramblings and I withdraw any claim I've made to being worthy of Talbot.
May 28th, 2005 at 6:04 pm
The best summary/defense of Calvinism I have ever read is J.I. Packer's introductory essay to John Owen's The Death of Death, found here.
May 28th, 2005 at 7:10 pm
Irony- I just ordered that book yesterday.