ETS 2006- James Spiegel: The Epistemic Ramifications of Behavior

November 21, 2006 Posted by Roger OvertoncloseAuthor: Roger Overton Name: Roger Overton
Email: rogeroverton@hotmail.com
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About: Roger Overton is currently pursuing a Masters degree at Talbot School of Theology. He has addressed various churches, schools and youth camps throughout the United States. Roger was co-editor of The New Media Frontier (Crossway, 2008) and God and Governing (Wipf & Stock, 2009). Roger can be emailed at rogeroverton@hotmail.com.See Authors Posts (570)

I find Dr. Spiegel to be one of the most intriguing philosophers of our time. He’s one of the few presenters that I’ll probably highlight every year from ETS.

The contemporary understanding of the relationship between behavior and beliefs is that our actions flow from our cognitions. However, several Old Testament texts seem to suggest otherwise (Psalm 19:7, 25:9, Proverbs 1:4). Dr. Spiegel aims to explore how behavior impacts our beliefs.

His case is built on the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. For Plantinga, a belief has “warrant” if 1) belief-forming mechanisms function properly, 2) operation is done in a favorable environment, 3) the cognitive system is successfully aimed at truth, and 4) there exists a sensus divinitatis. This is defined by Plantinga as “a kind of facult or cognitive mechanism… which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God.” (Warranted Christian Belief, 154)

Sin has corrupted our cognitions and affections, such that the sensus divinitatis has been baldy damaged. This skews our ability to love and hate the right things accurately. Linda Zagzebski has criticized Plantinga’s model for being deficient of virtue consideration. We should consider some virtue amendments that are important for our intellectual life, as well as our formation into good persons.

One such virtue is that of phronesis, or practical wisdom. This is the sort of insight that may be described as a truth conducting intellectual quality necessary for moral conduct. Aristotle believed that without this virtue, we couldn’t be morally virtuous. We should also seek sophia, or speculative wisdom. In contrast to phronesis, sophia has nothing to do with conduct, it is solely an intellectual virtue. These two virtues are both intellectual virtues of insight, but one is in practical matters and the latter is in theoretical. Zagzebksi adds that phronesis is a higher-order virtue that governs all others (moral and intellectual).

One way our behaviors affect our beliefs is derivatively. For example, I must decide what to expose myself to in regards to mass media. My selection of which shows I watch, websites I visit, or radio stations I listen to will impact my attitudes and beliefs either negatively or positively.

Romans 1:18-28 presents us with a moral vicious cycle from suppression of truth to ignorance of God to epistemic corruption and further bad behavior. One way this occurs is through self-deception, such as the Christian minister who taught there’s nothing wrong with porn because it doesn’t involve touching. William James suggested that beliefs are emotions. Accordingly, regardless of the method used to arrive at our conviction, “the fundamental phenomenological feature of these convictions is emotional: our belief feels right. This, says James, is the sentiment of rationality.” For example, when we slander, the emotional pleasures we feel from it displaces our previous negative emotional associations with it. This makes the offense more likely to be repeated, thus presenting another vicious cycle.

These are corruption of the original design plan, disturbing the proper-function of our belief-forming mechanisms, creating environments hostile to correct belief formation, and further destruction of the sensus divinitatis. Conversely, the practice of virtues (instead of vices) avoids these negative epistemic effects. Exposure to beauty of all kinds improves the moral imagination, which is important to moral action. Good conduct, then, maximizes our cognitive functions while minimizing corruption due to sin. Virtuous actions result in the strengthening of our faith. Instead of a vicious cycle, here we have a “virtuous cycle.”

The negative fallout from sin resulting from its compromise of phronesis, which governs both moral and intellectual virtues, shows that behavior effects us epistemically. We should therefore seek to acquire phronesis both for it’s practical and intellectual benefits.

Related posts:

1. Book Review: The Making of an Atheist by James Spiegel
2. Book Review: The Benefits of Providence by James Spiegel
3. ETS 2008 – James Spiegel “Free Will and Soul Making”
4. ETS 3: James Spiegel on Ethics and Art
5. Interview with James Spiegel
6. ETS 3.1- Where I Disagree with James Spiegel

Posted in Ethics, Main Page, Philosophy, Roger's Posts